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Abstract The paper analyses in some depth the distinction by Paul Humphreys
between ‘epistemic opacity’ —which I refer to as ‘weak epistemic opacity’ here—
and ‘essential epistemic opacity’, and defends the idea that epistemic opacity in
general can be made sense as coming in degrees. The idea of degrees of epistemic
opacity is then exploited to show, in the context of computer simulations, the tight
relation between the concept of epistemic opacity and actual scientific (modelling and
simulation) practices. As a consequence, interesting questions arise in connection
with the role of agents dealing with epistemically opaque processes such as computer
simulations.
1 Introduction
It is a general agreement that computer simulations characteristically have in epis-
temic opacity one of its central features. In that context epistemic opacity is com-
monly understood in terms of a lack of knowledge of the full details of the (compu-
tational) process,1 and is purportedly behind some of the issues that make computer
simulations so interesting, and arguably novel, from an epistemological point of
view (Humphreys, 2004, 2009; Parker, 2014; Winsberg, 2001, 2010). According to
Humphreys (2004, 2009), in fact, these issues are largely a consequence of what he
has termed the ‘anthropocentric predicament’, namely the problem as to “how we,
as humans, can understand and evaluate computationally based scientific methods
Iñaki San Pedro, e-mail: inaki.sanpedro@ehu.eus
1 Although epistemic opacity is usually discussed in the relevant literature in connection to knowl-
edge some voices, e.g., Stuart and Nersessian (2019), also emphasise the fact that it also involves
issues best addressed from the point of view of ‘understanding’. These are issues concerned with
the difficulties epistemic opacity introduces when it comes to understand the empirical content of
computational models.
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that transcend our own abilities” (Humphreys, 2009, p. 617). Epistemic opacity is
one such issues tightly related to the ‘anthropocentric predicament’.
Roughly, the idea of epistemic opacity refers to the impossibility to check, trace
or survey all the steps within a process such that we are no longer able to establish a
link between the process’ input and output. In the case of computer simulations this
in turn has obvious implications in connection with the justification of the outputs
of computer models, the knowledge they purportedly provide, as well as with their
acceptance as reliable effective scientific tools. In particular, due to the fact that
computer simulations involve epistemic opacity we often face difficulties when it
comes to justifying the inferences made at every step of the process (at least from a
standard epistemological point of view, based on the verification of the links between
some premises and their corresponding conclusions).
The fast growing literature on epistemic opacity has what I see as two shortcom-
ings. On the one hand, to my knowledge the notion of epistemic opacity is almost
exclusively discussed, at least as far as its implications concern, as a ‘yes-no’ prop-
erty of processes. Though it is true that some authors seem to be aware of the fact
that some processes are more (or less) opaque than others, i.e., that epistemic opacity
indeed comes in degrees, the issues at stake do not usually focus on that very fact
or its implications, but just concern instead questions around the idea that epistemic
opacity is a property that a process either possesses or not. Thus, issues around
epistemic opacity are invariably discussed with the idea in mind that processes are
(or are not) epistemically opaque, and little attention is paid to the implications of a
process being epistemically opaque to some extent only.2
On the other hand, the relevant literature does not emphasise enough, in my
opinion, important aspects of the strong dependence of epistemic opacity on agency.
In particular, little attention has been paid to questions concerning the precise role
of us humans as cognitive agents dealing with epistemically opaque processes, and
its relation to the specific (scientific) modelling practices that these involve.3 I shall
attempt to overcome these shortages here.
The object of this paper is thus twofold. On the one hand, the paper aims to
contribute to a better understanding of the concept of epistemic opacity, beyond the
commonplace views that take it as a ‘yes-no’ property. The paper intends to com-
plement this common lore by suggesting that an alternative view based on the idea
that epistemic opacity comes in degrees which can be manipulated is more fruitful,
especially in connection with actual modelling and simulation practices. Building on
this broader analysis of the concept in the specific case of computer simulations, the
paper aims at exploring, on the other hand, the relation between epistemic opacity
and actual modelling and simulating practices, and more specifically concerning the
role of agents (modeller scientists) in these.
2 Some authors do make explicit reference to ‘degrees of epistemic opacity’ (Durán and Formanek,
2018) or to a simulation being ‘partly opaque’ (Lenhard, 2019). Also, e.g., Kaminski et al. (2018),
Saam (2018) and even Humphreys’ original definition of the notion (Humphreys, 2004, 2009)
makes room for conceiving the idea that there are degrees of epistemic opacity (see definitions 1
and 2 below and my remarks to this extent in Section 2).
3 Some exceptions are, e.g., Durán and Formanek (2018); Newman (2015) or Kouw (2016).
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Thus, starting from Paul Humphreys (2009)’s original definitions of ‘epistemic
opacity’ —which I shall refer here as ‘weak epistemic opacity’ (see footnote 4)—
and ‘essential epistemic opacity’, the paper first discusses some presuppositions,
consequences and implications behind the concept of epistemic opacity itself. The
paper goes on to analyse in some depth Humphreys’ distinction in the context of
computer simulations. I argue that, while from a qualitative point of view the notion
of epistemic opacity can be identified as a fundamental characteristic common to
all computer simulations, from a quantitative perspective it seems very natural to
think of epistemic opacity as coming in degrees. This view sparks a number of
new questions concerning epistemic opacity: if we can make sense of the idea of
‘degrees of epistemic opacity’ then we may ask questions such as whether such
degrees may be measured and if so how exactly are they to be measured, whether
models and simulations displaying epistemic opacity can be manipulated such that
their opacity may be reduced at all —i.e., whether they can be transformed into
less opaque models or simulations— or be even completely eliminated, what is the
role of agents (scientists, modellers, etc.) and the actual scientific (simulation and
modelling) practices deployed by them in this regard, etc. The paper shall attempt to
answer some of these questions through the analysis of a specific example, namely
the simulation of the motion of the simple pendulum. The example is introduced, in
particular, as a tool to explore the limits of the concept of epistemic opacity rather
than to put into question the notion as a whole.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2 the precise notion(s) of
epistemic opacity to be discussed, following the original definitions in Humphreys
(2009), is presented. Humphreys’ definitions are discussed in some depth, revealing
some of the assumptions and presuppositions in them. With these in mind the idea
that epistemic opacity comes in degrees is then introduced as a more comprehensive
reading of the original definitions. In Section 3 the discussion is narrowed in to
the particular case of computer simulations, and goes deeper in the analysis and
prospective implications of the idea that epistemic opacity comes in degrees. In
Section 4 some of the consequences and implications of the discussion in the previous
sections are illustrated with the help of a specific example, i.e., the simulation of
the motion of a simple pendulum. The paper closes with some further remarks and
open questions concerning the relation between epistemic opacity, and specifically
the idea of ‘degrees of epistemic opacity’, and actual simulating and modelling
practices.
2 Two Notions of Epistemic Opacity
As pointed out earlier, the idea of epistemic opacity is usually framed in terms of
knowledge, and in the context of computer simulations it conveys, roughly, the idea
that it is not possible for human cognitive agents to trace, check or verify all the
steps of the process that a computer simulation involves. In the words of Wendy
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Parker, “no human can examine and justify every computational step performed by
the computer, because the steps are too numerous” (Parker, 2014, p. 142).
The idea is generalised beyond computer processes and human agents and made
more precise in Humphreys (2004, 2009). There, two different notions of epistemic
opacity are distinguished, which differ most notably in their respective logical struc-
tures, each arising from slightly different considerations concerning cognitive agents.
These two notions therefore have significantly different conceptual implications, as
we shall see.
Humphreys defines firstwhatwemay take as a (logically)weak notion of epistemic
opacity:4
Definition 1 (Weak Epistemic Opacity)
[A] process is [weakly] epistemically opaque relative to a cognitive agent 푋 at time 푡 just
in case 푋 does not know at 푡 all of the epistemically relevant elements of the process.
(Humphreys, 2009, p. 618)
The definition of ‘weak epistemic opacity’ above basically expresses a sufficiency
condition, i.e., it is sufficient for the agent 푋 to not know all of the epistemically rel-
evant elements of a process P at time 푡 for it to be epistemically opaque. Humphreys
also provides a stronger notion of epistemic opacity which includes, in addition, a
further necessity condition, namely ‘essential epistemic opacity’:
Definition 2 (Essential Epistemic Opacity)
A process is essentially epistemically opaque to [a cognitive agent] 푋 if and only if it is
impossible, given the nature of 푋 , for 푋 to know all of the epistemically relevant elements
of the process. (Humphreys, 2009, p. 618)
As I suggested before the two notions of epistemic opacity defined above,
i.e., ‘weak epistemic opacity’ and ‘essential epistemic opacity’, carry different con-
ceptual implications with them, which are worth considering. This is largely due to
the fact that Humphreys’ definitions are not the usual definitions of objects —based,
e.g. in a description of its properties, features, etc.— but logical statements concern-
ing some conditions a property, be it ‘weak epistemic opacity’ or ‘essential epistemic
opacity’, needs to fulfil to be defined so. In other words, both ‘weak epistemic opac-
ity’ and ‘essential epistemic opacity’ are properties, the ascription of whose (to a
process P) depends on some requirements expressed by logical statements.
A first thing to note then is that, since ‘weak epistemic opacity’ and ‘essential
epistemic opacity’ are properties of processes —specifically computer simulations
related processes in our case (see Section 3 to follow)—, computer algorithms,
difference equations, analytical equations, theorems, etc., are not per se epistemically
4 Humphreys (2009) refers to this first notion of epistemic opacity simply as ‘epistemic opacity’. In
order to stress the distinction of the two notions of epistemic opacity further and highlight the fact
that this first notion has in fact a logically weaker structure, I shall refer to it as ‘weak epistemic
opacity’ in what follows. Throughout the paper I will use the expression ‘epistemic opacity’ in
a generic way instead to refer to either ‘weak epistemic opacity’ or ‘essential epistemic opacity’
indistinctly.
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opaque. It is a particular (computer) process P, the undergoing of which may of
course involve one or more of the above, that is epistemically opaque. This already
brings to mind the idea that actual computer modelling and simulation specific
practices may prove central and, in particular, the intuition that epistemic opacity is
tightly related to such hands-on scientific practice.5
A second relevant feature in both definitions above is that epistemic opacity in
general —i.e., whether we refer to ‘weak epistemic opacity’ or ‘essential epistemic
opacity’— is an agent-relative notion. The role of the agent, however, is different
in each of the two notions. More precisely, the two definitions differ in how actual
agents relate to a purportedly epistemically opaque process P. On the one hand, we
see for instance that the notion of ‘weak epistemic opacity’ is contingent on what
we could term the ‘state of knowledge’ of an agent 푋 . This ‘state of knowledge’
involves, not only 푋’s own intrinsic epistemic capacities but also the fact that, within
the limits set by these, the agent can gain further knowledge about the process P.
The agent’s ‘state of knowledge’ therefore may very well vary (improve) over time,
even to a point that 푋 comprehends the full epistemic details of process P. As a
result, then, to one same agent 푋 a process P might be (weakly) epistemic opaque at
time 푡 but it might well be perfectly epistemically transparent at another time 푡 ′. The
notion of ‘essential epistemic opacity’ on the other hand does not hinge on the ‘state
of knowledge’ of the agent 푋 , but just on her epistemic capacities and limitations —
i.e., what Humphreys refers to as the ‘nature of 푋’. In this sense, ‘essential epistemic
opacity’ is nothing else than a particular case of ‘weak epistemic opacity’ —for the
case in which it is the intrinsic nature of the agent 푋 , which we assume does not
change over time, what does not allow her to know the full epistemic details of the
process P at any given time 푡.
At a first readingHumphreys’ definitionsmay suggest that we should think of epis-
temic opacity (either ‘weak epistemic opacity’ or ‘essential epistemic opacity’) as a
‘binary’ property of a given processP, i.e., as a ‘yes-no’ property. This interpretation
is reinforced by the fact that Humphreys’ definitions are laid out in logical terms as
requirements for a process P to be epistemically opaque. Thus, the definitions work
well when it comes to distinguishing or identifying epistemically opaque processes.
In other words, a process P is defined to be either (weak or essential) epistemically
opaque or not depending on whether it does fulfil the requirements in the relevant
definition, i.e., on whether or not an agent 푋 has full epistemic knowledge of it.
Despite the fact they are logical statements Humphreys’ definitions make room,
or at least allow, for further qualifications concerning the different variables involved
in them i.e., cognitive agents, states of knowledge or processes, which point to the
idea that epistemic opacity can be conceived beyond a ‘yes-no’ approach as coming
in degrees. While this observation is not new,6 I should stress once more that the
literature on the subject does focus mostly on issues arising from an analysis of
5 I briefly address this issues in the closing remarks in Section 5.
6 See, e.g., Durán and Formanek (2018); Kaminski et al. (2018); Lenhard (2019) or Saam (2018).
Also Humphreys himself refers at some point to ‘partially epistemically opaque’ processes in
contrast with ‘fully epistemically opaque’ ones (Humphreys, 2009), thus entertaining the idea that
epistemic opacity comes in degrees.
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epistemic opacity understood as a ‘yes-no’ property. However, thinking of epistemic
opacity exclusively in binary terms may leave aside important considerations that
have to do, not only with the agent’s 푋 nature and epistemic capacities, but also for
instance with her more pragmatic attitude, purpose when engaging with a concrete
process P—such as e.g., the use of computer simulations—, or other considerations
concerning the actual process itself, etc. In sum, there is nothing, really, in the
definitions above that forces on us a view of epistemic opacity strictly in binary terms,
and going beyond this conception is fruitful both to achieve a better understanding of
the notion of epistemic opacity itself as well its implications concerning the role of
cognitive agents and their methods in dealing with epistemically opaque processes.
As I have already noted above, given the definition of ‘weak epistemic opacity’,
whether a process P is said to be weakly epistemically opaque depends on the ‘state
of knowledge’ of the agent 푋 , which typically changes over time. This in turn means
that a process P may be found to be (weakly) epistemically opaque to an agent 푋
having different ‘states of knowledge’ at different times 푡 and 푡 ′. The question then
arises whether the process P is going to be equally epistemically opaque to 푋 at
time 푡 and at time 푡 ′. Intuitively, the answer to this question should be in the negative,
leading to the idea of degrees of epistemic opacity, at least when it comes to the
notion of ‘weak epistemic opacity’ (but see below for an extension of the argument
to ‘essential epistemic opacity’).
Similarly, for one same process P, two different agents 푋 and 푋 ′ may present
different ‘states of knowledge’ at the same time 푡. Thus, it seems rather natural to
think that, at the very samemoment 푡, a processP is not equally epistemically opaque
to 푋 and 푋 ′. With this consideration in mind, we can carry the idea that epistemic
opacity comes in degrees all the way to the stronger definition of ‘essential epistemic
opacity’. For two cognitive agents 푋 and 푋 ′ need not have the same epistemic
capacities, i.e., they each can have a different epistemic nature. The idea of degrees
of epistemic opacity can be supported further by noting that even for one same
agent 푋 there are processes that may present different ‘depths’ of epistemic opacity.
Put it another way, two different processes P and P ′ may involve different degrees
of epistemic opacity for one same agent 푋 at a given time 푡. Such considerations
apply equally to both ‘weak epistemic opacity’ and ‘essential epistemic opacity’. An
interesting issue in this context concerns whether cognitive agents might be capable
of transforming a process P into another one P ′ such as the epistemic opacity
associated to the former differs from that of the latter. We shall pursue this and
related issues in the following two sections.
Once we have made sense of the idea that epistemic opacity comes in degrees,
whether we refer specifically to the notion of ‘weak epistemic opacity’ or to ‘essential
epistemic opacity’, we may further note that ‘essential epistemic opacity’ introduces
a crucial difference, namely that there is a threshold to epistemic transparency (as
opposed to opacity). This threshold is in fact a lower bound of opacity set by the
‘nature’ of the agent 푋 involved, i.e., given her specific epistemic capacities. Thus,
while ‘weak epistemic opacity’ leaves it open whether an agent 푋 may reach at some
time 푡 a state of knowledge in which she knows ‘all of the epistemically relevant
elements’ of the process P, in the case of ‘essential epistemic opacity’ this option
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might not be possible at all (when the particular epistemic capacities of a cognitive
agent unavoidably prevent it). This suggests that for some agents some processes are
‘irreducibly’ epistemically opaque.
In sum, epistemic opacity being crucially defined as an agent relative property
of certain processes, a property that depends on the specific epistemic capacities of
the agent involved as well as on the agent’s ‘state of knowledge’ with respect to the
epistemic relevant details of such process, can be said to admit degrees. But, also,
on the other hand, it has become clear that despite the fact that there are degrees
of epistemic opacity, and because the notion is heavily dependent on the actual
epistemic capacities of the agent, it may not always be possible to reduce opacity
such that it is eliminated completely, for given specific cases (processes).
In this context thus a whole range of new interesting questions arise. There are
questions, for instance, concerning the actual meaning of the idea of degrees of
epistemic opacity and how it is to be implemented; whether such degrees can be
measured at all and, if so, how are they to be measured; whether the measuring will
inevitably be subjective —mainly because of its strong dependence on agents— or
whether it can be otherwise made objective, etc.
This paper is not concerned so much with such questions but with issues in
connection with the actual role of agents and their practices in connection to specific
processes (which we may regard as epistemically opaque). Thus, for instance, as
hinted above, it remains openwhether agentsmay be able to transform—e.g., through
specific practices— a given process P into another one P ′ so that their respective
epistemic opacities associated to them turn out to be also substantially different.
Questions such as this are absolutely relevant in connection for instance with the
use of computer simulations and their philosophical status as effective scientific
tools. Thus, I shall narrow the focus of my analysis to the specific case of computer
processes, i.e., computer simulation practices, designed, built, run, etc., by human
agents. In this context I shall explore issues concerning the possibility that usual
scientific practice may effectively reduce epistemic opacity in computer simulations.
3 Epistemic Opacity of Computer Simulations
Let us turn then to the specific case of computer simulations as potentially epistemic
opaque processes. We may regard in fact computer simulations as a good benchmark
to test some of the intuitions outlined above, and tackle the questions related to these.
A good place to start seems to explore in more detail the issue as to whether the
processes involved in computer simulations are indeed epistemically opaque or not,
and if so, what kind of epistemic opacity they feature.
This question in not new, and has in fact already been answered by Humphreys
himself:
[N]o human can examine and justify every element of the computational processes that
produce the output of a computer simulation or other artifacts of computational science [. . . ]
Many, perhaps all, of the features that are special to simulations are a result of this inability of
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human cognitive abilities to know and understand the details of the computational process.
The computations involved in most simulations are so fast and so complex that no human or
group of humans can in practice reproduce or understand the processes. (Humphreys, 2009,
p. 618)
The quotation above thus makes clear that not only are computer simulations
epistemically opaque processes but also that they are essentially epistemically opaque
to us humans as cognitive agents. In other words, according to Humphreys the
epistemic opacity displayed in the running of computer simulations is basically
associated to the lack in human’s ability to trace, understand and justify “every
element of the computational process”. By definition, this is just ‘essential epistemic
opacity’.
Following this line of thought a further important remark concerning the epistemic
status of computer simulations in relation to humans as cognitive agents is in order,
however. Namely, we must note that because of the logic structure of the definition of
‘essential epistemic opacity’ discussed in Section 2, if we restrict the use of computer
simulations to human agents only we may very well claim that computer simulations
not only are (essentially) epistemically opaque but also that they are necessarily
so. Put it another way, computer simulations are essentially opaque to humans as
cognitive agents but also it is sufficient for a cognitive agent to be a human to claim
that computer simulations are epistemically opaque to her.
This conclusion is well inline with some of our conclusions in the previous
section. In particular, and as far as we (human cognitive agents) are dealing with
computer simulations, we seem to be able to claim safely that there is a threshold
in our knowledge of the computer process which we are not able to cross given our
particular (human) epistemic capacities. Therefore the process, i.e., the computer
simulation, is essentially epistemically opaque. In sum, for us human agents computer
simulations feature an irreducible epistemic opacitywhich in principle is not possible
to eliminate.
Going back to the idea that epistemic opacity comes in degrees, however, the
remarks above do not preculde the possibility that the epistemic opacity initially
associated to a specific computer simulation may be reduced somehow. In fact it was
also one of the conclusions of Section 2 that even in the case of ‘essential epistemic
opacity’ we can make sense of epistemic opacity as admitting degrees.
The interesting question then —which we can now ask in the specific context of
computer simulations— is whether it is possible at all to reduce epistemic opacity
to some extent (or degree), even such that it can be even eliminated. In other words,
is it really the case that epistemic opacity in computer simulations is absolutely
irreducible (meaning non-eliminable)? More specifically, is it true for any computer
simulation that it is irreducibly epistemically opaque to human cognitive agents, as
Humphreys claims in the quotation above, or is it possible, as opposed to that, to
make sense of some computer simulation as an epistemically transparent process
somehow, despite our (human) cognitive and epistemic limitations? Attempting to
give answers to these questions shall put scientific (modelling and simulation) prac-
tices at the centerstage. In particular, as I hinted above, actual practices (modelling
and simulation practices) carried out in this case by human agents (scientists) shall
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prove crucial in any attempt to explain the reduction (and perhaps elimination) of
epistemic opacity in computer simulations. This shall open, on the other hand, a fur-
ther whole range of new interesting questions concerning the precise role of humans
as cognitive agents when it comes to the use computer simulations as a scientific
tool. We may ask for instance what is the precise role of agents in attempting to
reduce (or eliminate) epistemic opacity.
Before going on to address such issues, however, a note is in order concerning
what would mean to reduce or eliminate epistemic opacity. In order to understand
reduction of epistemic opacity we shall first make clear what a fully epistemically
transparent process may look like. Given that we are dealing with computer simula-
tions, a rather straightforward way to think of transparency seems to be in opposition
to what typically introduces opacity in computer simulations, namely complexity.
Recall that according to Humphreys it is our inability as cognitive agents to “exam-
ine and justify every element of the computational processes” what is behind the
epistemic opacity of highly complex processes such as computer simulations. As
opposed to that then we may identify ‘epistemically transparent’ processes as those
characterised by little complexity or ideally a complete lack of it. In the limiting
case, a fully ‘epistemically transparent’ process would be that involving exclusively
equations that can be solved analytically.
In order to address the questions above I shall make use of a simple, although ar-
guably somehow artificial, example of a computer simulation, namely the simulation
of the motion of a simple pendulum. I propose the example, in particular, as a tool to
explore the limits of the concept of epistemic opacity and suggest new issues rather
than to put into question the notion as whole. I shall attempt to show, in particular,
that the wide range of methodological techniques modelling and simulation scien-
tists typically deploy when putting computer simulations at work have an impact on
epistemic opacity. This includes, for instance, as the example specifically shows, the
use of expert knowledge to effectively reduce a simulations’s original complexity.7
I hope to make clear, furthermore, that the idea of degrees of epistemic opacity is
crucial to that effect.
4 Reducing Epistemic Opacity in Computer Simulations
Consider a particularly simple example of a computer simulation. Namely, the sim-
ulation of the motion of a simple pendulum (see Figure 1). As is well known, the
motion of a simple pendulum, in its most general case —that is, for arbitrarily large
oscillation amplitudes—, is governed by the following non-linear equation:
7 This should not come as a surprise since the use of expert knowledge, in one sense or another,
is widely regarded as necessary in many cases of computer simulation as a complexity reduction
technique (see, e.g., Winsberg (2001)). And one can argue that, even if issues concerning epistemic
opacity may not be explicitly present in the modeller’s mind when using expert knowledge, its use
has clearly as a motivation to simplify the original problem, making it more tractable and, after all,
easier to grasp epistemically.
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Fig. 1 An oscillating simple
pendulum.
m
L
θ
푑2휃
푑푡2
+ 푔
퐿
푠푖푛휃 = 0. (1)
The equation above, being non-linear, cannot be solved applying standard math-
ematical analytic methods. It needs to be solved instead by applying numerical
methods, which results in a computer simulation of the motion of the pendulum. We
do not need to describe in detail the specifics of the actual simulation here. It will
be enough to point out that it will include, roughly, the designing of an appropriate
algorithm, applying a range of numerical methods to implement it, performing the
corresponding calculations, and finally plotting the calculation outputs into a sensi-
ble image that we can ‘read’, allowing for an interpretation of the result.8 In Figure 2
the corresponding numerical solution to the equation of motion is plotted. The image
displays constant energy orbits in phase space —i.e., velocity 푑휃/푑푡 versus position
(amplitudes) 휃 normalised values— which gives and idea of the motion of the pen-
dulum for given energy values. This solution, as the plot shows, applies to arbitrarily
large oscillation angles.
According to what we have seen so far the process that comprises the solving of
equation (1) into the output in Figure 2 is to be regarded as an epistemically opaque
process. But not only that. For, according to Humphreys, since we are dealing with a
computer simulation, from the human agent point of view, the process is necessarily
an essentially epistemically opaque one—featuring, again necessarily, an irreducible
component of epistemic opacity.
As I pointed out, the above, being the solution to the general equation of motion
for the simple pendulum, applies to arbitrarily large oscillation angles. For the case
of small oscillations, however, the problem of the motion of the simple pendulum
can be approached differently.
8 Note that here I am implicitly endorsing the view that computer simulations are not just number
crunching processes, but rather part of a more complex ‘multi-component’ scientific practice. This
will be a relevant point in the discussion to come.
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Fig. 2 Motion of a simple pendulum for arbitrarily large oscillations (constant energy contours in
phase space).
To start with, it is well know that for small enough oscillating amplitudes the
general equation (1) above can be simplified substantially in terms of its complexity.
In particular, for small enough amplitudes, i.e., for 휃 ≈ 0, we have that9
푠푖푛휃 ≈ 휃. (2)
This in turn means that, for small amplitudes, the general equation of motion
above can now be rewritten as
푑2휃
푑푡2
+ 푔
퐿
휃 = 0. (3)
This is a linear second order differential equation, which can be handled using
standard mathematics and admits an analytical solution, namely
9 The approximation below is the result of considering the first term of Taylor expansion of the
function 푠푖푛휃 , i.e.,
푠푖푛휃 = 휃 − 휃
3
3!
+ 휃
5
5!
− 휃
7
7!
+ . . .
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Fig. 3 Motion of a simple pendulum for small oscillations (constant energy contours in phase
space).
휃 (푡) = 휃표 cos
(√
푔
퐿
푡
)
. (4)
The solution can be plotted, as in the case of arbitrarily large amplitudes, as
a phase space diagram, displaying the motion of the simple pendulum (for small
amplitudes) at different energy values (see Figure 3).
In contrast to the case of the motion of the pendulum for arbitrarily large am-
plitudes, we may now claim that arriving at the small amplitudes solution, given it
only involves standard mathematical operations (and knowledge), constitutes a fully
epistemologically transparent process (see my remarks to this effect at the end of
Section 3).
What we have just seen illustrates nicely a very commonplace typical procedure in
computer simulation practice. Namely the use of expert knowledge, which is invoked
at many levels and stages of a simulation, to simplify its original complexity. The
use of expert knowledge varies depending on the specific field of application of
a simulation, or the purposes and interests of the scientist running it. It may be
aimed for instance at making the problem computer-wise simpler or more tractable,
at reducing computing time and power, etc., and typically includes, among other
things, the use of mathematical tricks —this is actually the case in the example of
the simple pendulum above—, substituting and/or eliminating variables, a range of
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parametrisation techniques, the use of empirical laws, etc. These kind of procedures,
as pointed out, are very commonplace in actual simulating and modelling practice in
a wide variety of fields, ranging from climate science, astrophysics, or high energy
physics to population genetics and econometrics.10
In a sense what we just saw is nothing new and, of course, the use of expert
knowledge in this context is usually very well justified —be it either formally,
technically, scientifically, etc.— and thus in general does not spark any controversies.
However, if we focus specifically on the issue of epistemic opacity, we may now see
that the use of expert knowledge, along with simplifying the original complexity
of a simulation with different purposes in mind, helps reduce epistemic opacity.
Even more, if the reduction of epistemic opacity by using expert knowledge is
taken to the limit, we may end in a complete elimination of epistemic opacity as a
result, as the example of the simple pendulum above shows. In sum, making use of
expert knowledge, which is part of the standard scientific practice in modelling and
simulation, may help reducing epistemic opacity and even eliminating it fully (as
long as we manage to transform the problem into an analytically solvable one).11
This is indeed a good example of one of the ideas hinted at the end of Section 3,
where we asked whether a process P could be ‘transformed’ into another one P ′
such that the later displayed a different (reduced) degree of epistemic opacity with
respect to one same agent 푋 . In this case, as we can see, an epistemically opaque
process, i.e., the original computer simulation of the motion of the simple pendulum,
can be transformed, for the case of small enough oscillation amplitudes, into a new
process that seamlessly simulates the original system, i.e the motion of a simple
pendulum, which according to our remarks in the previous section can be regarded
as epistemically transparent. As a consequence, and going a step further, we may
claim that the assumption that computer simulations are necessarily epistemically
opaque cannot be maintained in general.
This conclusion opens a new range of questions concerning the role of agents
(i.e., experts) as regards the epistemological status of tools such as computer simula-
tions. But before we go on to discuss the possible implications of the above, we need
to deal with what could be a serious objection. It can be objected, in particular, that
once we have transformed our original computer simulation —of the motion of the
simple pendulum for arbitrarily large oscillations in this case— into an analytically
solvable problem we are not dealing with a computer simulation any more. Thus,
the example above would not provide any evidence that computer simulations are
not necessarily epistemically opaque, as we just concluded.
There are at least to answers one can offer to deal with the objection above.
First, it needs to be stressed that the objection relies crucially on how the expression
computer simulation is understood. In particular, since there are different notions
10 It is perhaps worth pointing out, as a side remark, that some authors attribute some of the
epistemic particularities associated to computer simulations to the fact that they involve this kind
of praxis. Some go as far as to claim that it is (partly) because of this that computer simulations
demand a new epistemology (Winsberg, 2001, 2010).
11 This is not to say that a full such reduction of epistemic opacity can be achieved in all cases. This
is in fact the most common scenario when it comes to computer simulations of complex systems.
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of computer simulation on offer, whether the objection effective or not will rest
heavily on which of these views is endorsed. So, drawing for instance on a standard
distinction in the literature (Winsberg, 2019; Parker, 2014) the expression ‘computer
simulation’ can be understood either in a narrow sense or a broad sense, or else in
terms of similarity.
We do not need to go into the distinction in great detail here and it will enough
to recall that, roughly, a computer simulation is understood in a narrow sense as
referring basically to the actual specific routines running on a computer12 to solve
numerically a very often analytically intractable or unsolvable problem, i.e., ‘number-
crunching’. A broader understanding of the notion of computer simulation takes into
account instead, not just the actual ‘number crunching’ component, but the whole
process of choosing a model, implementing an algorithm, calculating numerically
the output of that algorithm, analysing and visualising resulting data, etc. Finally,
a third notion of the term is also documented in Humphreys (2009) and Winsberg
(2010, 2019) following Hartmann (1996)’s view on simulation based on the idea of
similarity, either dynamical or structural, between a system and its simulation.13
Thus, if we consider the three possible understandings of computer simulations,
we can easily see that the objection will only stand if a narrow sense of computer
simulation is endorsed. For, since under that view computer simulations are identified
exclusively as number crunching processes, analytical problems will clearly fall out
of this classification. If computer simulations are understood instead in a broader
sense to include, beyond the actual number crunching process, the choosing of the
most convenient or effective algorithm, the application of appropriate numerical
methods to implement it, any parametrisation, approximation or simplification, the
actual numerical calculations, analysing and visualising resulting data, etc., one can
argue that the whole process —which involves transforming the non-linear problem
of the motion of the simple pendulum for arbitrarily large oscillations into our
analytically solvable problem (for small enough angles), solving it, and representing
the raw numerical output— may also be considered a simulation. The objection
above, thus, would not stand in this case. Similarly, if computer simulations are
understood as processes based in the idea of similarity14, it can be argued that
just like the simulation of the motion of the simple pendulum for arbitrarily large
oscillations is indeed a simulation in virtue of the fact that there is some (dynamical)
similarity with respect to the motion of the actual physical system, the simplified
12 It is important to distinguish between a computer routine –i.e., the code– to be run on a computer
and the routine actually running. While the former does not convey barely epistemological novelty
concerning the dynamical properties of the simulation, the latter does. This point is stressed and
well motivated in Humphreys (2009), for instance. This stresses, once more, the importance of
understanding computer simulations as actual processes which are actually run.
13A important point which is however incidental to our discussion here is that this distinction on how
to understand computer simulation seems key when addressing the issue as to whether computer
simulations involve epistemological novelty of any kind —or even demand a new epistemology.
This is a hot issue in the literature with strong arguments on both sides. See, for instance, Frigg and
Reiss (2009); Humphreys (2009); Winsberg (2001).
14 This seems the view preferred by Humphreys (2009) as opposed to a narrow understanding of
computer simulations endorsed by Frigg and Reiss (2009) for instance.
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version of the problem still conserves that (dynamical) similarity with respect to
the motion of the actual physical system, even if only for small enough oscillation
angles. In that sense, therefore, we can claim that the later can also be considered a
simulation.
The point can be pushed harder, however. For, it can be objected further that the
above overlooks a crucial feature of the similarity view of computer simulations.
Namely, that under this view the term computer is just as important, and that a com-
puter simulation is a simulation which happens to be performed with a computer.
With this in mind, it can be pointed out that while the case of the simulation of the
motion of the simple pendulum for arbitrarily large oscillations is clearly a computer
simulation —i.e., a computer is needed to solve numerically the problem—, the
simplified case (for small oscillations), even if it can be still taken as a simulation,
is not a computer simulation any more since no computer is involved in solving
such an analytical equation. To this, one can reply by asking in turn what is really
the difference between solving numerically a differential equation (such as equa-
tion (1) in the example of the motion of the simple pendulum above), and calculating
the values of the relevant variables entering some well defined analytical function
(e.g., equation (4)). So if, at the end of the day, what we need is to come up in either
case with a numerical output, i.e., a table of numerical values, which can be turned
into a plot or similar that allows for their interpretation, both processes seem rather
similar, if not exactly the same, from an operational point of view. To my mind, thus,
there is no difference beyond the fact that in one case the operation may require more
steps, computer time or effort.
There is a further point that can be made as regards the original objection for-
mulated above that once we reach an analytically solvable problem (with the help
of expert knowledge), we are not dealing with a computer simulation anymore. The
point is, in particular, that the use of expert knowledge may as well be epistemically
opaque in itself. To that extent, therefore, transforming a highly complex problem
which is to be solved using a computer simulation into an analytically solvable one
by introducing concrete elements of expert knowledge may be seen to result, not re-
ally in the elimination of the epistemic opacity originally attributed to the computer
simulation, but just in a ‘redistribution’ of it. More specifically, it can be argued that,
at the end of the day, expert knowledge may just ‘absorb’ the epistemic opacity orig-
inally associated to a computer simulation rather than eliminate it. In other words,
scientific practice, as exemplified for instance by the use of expert knowledge, may
not quite help eliminating epistemic opacity in the context of computer simulations
but just transform it, or shift it around, once the whole process is taken into consid-
eration. This line of though would seem to reconcile our claims as a consequence
of the analysis of the simulation of the simple pendulum above with Humphreys’
views that computer simulations are necessarily (essentially) epistemically opaque
to human cognitive agents. The issue may be trickier than that, however, since in this
new approach considerations about the role of agents and their actual practices when
dealing with potentially epistemically opaque processes —beyond an agent’s epis-
temic capabilities or her ‘state of knowledge’ at some time 푡— become absolutely
relevant. In the context of computer simulations simulations, more in particular, such
16 Iñaki San Pedro
considerations may have an impact for instance on the epistemic status, effectivity
and reliability of computer simulations as scientific tools.
5 Closing Remarks and Open Questions
The discussion above illustrates, above all, the strong dependence between agency
and epistemic opacity, or better, how is the latter understood. This dependence is so
strong, in fact, that one could even go as far as to claim that whether a process proves
epistemically opaque or not —or, more precisely, in what degree a process proves
epistemically opaque— depends not only on the particular epistemic capabilities
or limitations of an agent —the ‘nature’ of an agent in the words of Humphreys—
and/or her epistemic ‘state of knowledge’ at a given moment, but also on how agents
‘interact’ with the process itself, i.e., on the actual scientific practice. This is what in
may opinion examples such as the simulation of the motion of the simple pendulum
above illustrate. The issue, as suggested above, sparks a number of new interesting
questions.
For instance, a first issue we may want to tackle concerns whether epistemic
opacity is merely agent-related or, in a stronger sense, an agent-induced or agent-
generated notion. In particular, if Humphreys’ definitions are taken literally one can
think of epistemic opacity as simply an agent dependent notion, meaning that the
agents’ specific epistemic nature and/or state of knowledge are just enough to claim-
ing whether a process is epistemically opaque or not, without further qualification.
However, as we saw above, if we consider the idea of degrees of epistemic opacity
we then move into new ground. For in such as case it is not the specific ‘epistemic
qualities’ of the agent that we just need to consider but also the actual ‘interactions’
of the agent with the process—e.g., specific modelling and simulation practices. We
have seen that the impact of such ‘interactions’ may result in a reduction (or, with
some qualification, even an elimination) of epistemic opacity. Thus, in this view we
are thenmoving from epistemic opacity as an agent-related notion to a more complex
notion in which the agent is capable to induce/reduce epistemic opacity depending
on the actual practices in play.
We may also inquire into whether there is a relation between epistemic opacity
and (some) model uncertainties. It can be argued in this respect that the use of expert
knowledge typically introduces model uncertainties in the actual simulations.15 In
view of this and with the discussion above in mind we can conclude that reducing
epistemic opacity by means of the use of expert knowledge may entail, on the other
hand, an increase of model uncertainties. If this is so, then, there would seem to
be a tension between the degree of epistemic opacity which a simulation involves
and the model uncertainties it contains. In this sense, optimising epistemically a
model by reducing its opacity would require a careful trade-off between the amount
of expert knowledge to be used and the amount of uncertainties it may introduce so
15 Note that this need not apply to other kinds of uncertainties, such as those originating in the
actual computer calculations, which can in fact even be reduced.
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that the right balance is reached. (I have in mind, in particular, cases in which the
use of expert knowledge may on the one hand simplify the original problem such
that it is transformed into an analytically solvable one but, on the other hand, the
simplification is made at the expense of e.g., approximations, which would introduce
structural model uncertainties.)
Of course, the above applies only if epistemic opacity is in fact reduced and
not ‘shifted around’ or redistributed (being removed so to speak from the actual
computer process to become associated to expert knowledge), as we argued above
it could be the case. Considering such a situation would rise further questions,
however, concerning modelling and simulation practice. We may want to explore,
for instance, whether the epistemic opacity attributed to expert knowledge would
still be of the same kind than that associated to computer simulations. The answer
to this question would take us back to the issues related to the distinction between
‘weak epistemic opacity’ and ‘essential epistemic opacity’. In particular, it would
seem rather straightforward to think that epistemic opacity associated to the use of
expert knowledge will be closer to the idea of ‘weak epistemic opacity’, since the
epistemic nature of the agent does not seem to play a role in this case.16 If this is
so then, and if the answer to our question above is in the positive, i.e., if epistemic
opacity associated to expert knowledge is in fact of the same kind that the epistemic
opacity at the actual computer solving process level, we must then conclude that
we are dealing really with ‘weak epistemic opacity’ throughout. As a consequence
therefore the idea of ‘essential epistemic opacity’ would not apply to the computer
process component of the simulation either. This latter claim certainly sounds daring,
though, if not straightforwardly in opposition with Humphreys’ intuition that it is not
possible for us humans as cognitive agents to be able to follow “examine and justify
every element of the computational processes that produce the output of a computer
simulation” (Humphreys, 2009, p. 618).
Exploring such issues could also take us to ask further questions specifically about
the epistemic status of computer simulations, especially if these are understood as
a whole complex process where scientific practice —crucially characterised by the
intervention of agents— is at its very centre. One can analyse in particular, for
instance, whether we should favour, be inclined, or be in a better disposition to
accept, e.g., as more reliable, epistemic opacity resulting from the use of expert
knowledge than that associated to the actual computer process.
These are interesting issues which deserve further analysis and perhaps a full
paper on their own. What it seems clear, in any case, is that regardless of the answers
to such questions, we can claim confidently that scientific practice is tightly related
to the notion of epistemic opacity, and further that it has an impact on how epistemic
opacity is to be understood. The discussion above hopefully has made this clear
16 This is not to say, of course, that the epistemic nature of the agent does not set any restrictions
or conditions on the actual expert knowledge that comes into play. The character of the expert
knowledge, the range of possibilities of the knowledge, so to speak, does depend on the epistemic
nature of the agent. However, once that range of possibilities of knowledge is set, whether this or
that specific piece of expert knowledge is introduced in the building of a simulation will not depend
on the nature of the agent any more.
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enough. I hope to have also been successful in suggesting that thinking of epistemic
opacity as coming in degrees is indeed a fruitful approach. As I argued, this view on
epistemic opacity contributes to reveal important aspects of scientific practice in the
context of computer simulations. In particular it helps appreciating that the use of
expert knowledge in the computer modelling and simulation practice plays a crucial
role in the dealing with epistemically opaque processes, helping manage, justify or
attempt to reduce epistemic opacity.
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